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ABSTRACT

KANTIAN MEADOWS: A JUST NURSING HOME GROUNDED IN THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
By
Faith Bjalobok
This dissertation examines the structures of contemporary nursing homes and
argues that the structure is conducive to the objectification (treatment of a human being
as a non-person) of nursing home residents. In order to eliminate the potential for
objectification, this project employs the Kantian categorical imperative as its theoretical
framework. Based on that framework Kantian Meadows is created as an example of a just
nursing home.
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Preface

As I finally sit down to write my dissertation, I realize that I have reached the last
milestone in what has been, for me, a life long quest for an understanding of justice. It is
a quest, which for me, began as a patient in a state mental hospital and has continued
through my employment in various “total institutions.” The quest for an understanding
of justice brought me to philosophy and to write this particular dissertation.
Like many others who have either experienced or witnessed injustice, I too am
driven by a passionate desire to in some way further the cause of justice. My choice of a
philosophical path is largely due to the influence of Dr. Paul Edwards and Dr. Will
Aiken.
Although Kantian ethics is often criticized as being purely formal, I found in
Kant’s writings an understanding of the anger I felt towards what I perceive as grave
injustices carried out against individuals confined in “total institutions.” My decision to
focus on the nursing home is the result of the four and a half years I spent as a certified
nursing assistant. Of all the “total institutions” in which I have been either confined or
employed I am most haunted by what I see as the systematic degradation of the
individuals who are confined in our nation’s nursing homes. Although nursing homes
profess in theory to be places of caring, I would argue that in practice they are places of
degradation.
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Chapter One
The Nursing Home and the Ethical Problem of Objectification
Project Overview
My aim in this dissertation is to argue for the following thesis: Nursing homes
are unethical in the strong philosophical sense of the term because they erode autonomy,
personhood, and human dignity, and the end formulation of the Kantian categorical
imperative can provide a theoretical framework for creating a just nursing home. In order
to develop the above stated thesis I will argue for six distinct but inter-related
propositions.
First, the structure and characteristics of nursing homes create an environment
conducive to objectification. Second, objectification is a moral evil. Third, the care
perspective does not offer an adequate framework for addressing the problem of
objectification. Fourth, based on Kantian ethics we have an indirect duty to treat nonrational persons “as if they were persons.” Fifth, the end formulation of the categorical
imperative which instructs us “never to treat humanity as a mere means, but always as an
end in itself” suggests guidelines for developing a just nursing. Sixth, those guidelines
have practical applications in developing nursing home guidelines and procedures. The
above-mentioned propositions will be developed in the following chapters.
In Chapter One, I will develop Propositions One and Two. That is, I will examine
the characteristics and structure of nursing homes in order to shed some light on the
precise sense in which nursing homes are unethical. In other words, I will illustrate the
1
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way in which the characteristics and practices of nursing homes contribute to the
objectification of nursing home residents. I will also examine various literatures from a
variety of academic disciplines in order to establish the sense in which objectification is a
moral evil.
In Chapter Two, I will develop Proposition Three. That is, I will demonstrate the
way in which the care perspective is inadequate in terms of addressing the problem of
objectification. This will be accomplished based on an analysis of the basic precepts of
the care perspective and their application to the Kennedy Project on Aging.
In Chapter Three, I will develop Propositions Four and Five. In developing
Proposition Three, I will argue that we have an indirect duty to treat non-rational humans
“as if they were persons.” My position is that this indirect duty is analogous to our
indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals. Next I will develop Proposition Four. In
other words, I will argue that we have a duty both not to lie, coerce, deceive or
manipulate nursing home residents and to avert potential obstacles to individual
autonomy.
Finally, in Chapter Four I will develop Proposition Six and apply the principles
and guidelines implied by the end formulation of the categorical imperative to the
creation of Kantian Meadows. This chapter will develop guidelines and procedures that
uphold the duties imposed upon nursing homes by the end formulation of the categorical
imperative.
Introduction
The nursing home is supposed to be a place for the long term care of the
physically and mentally incapacitated members of our society. However, rather than
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viewing the nursing home as a place of care, the elderly often view the nursing home
with repugnance. In a society, such as contemporary America, which is built on the
Enlightenment principles of freedom and individual autonomy, the idea of confinement in
a nursing home creates fear. The elderly are frequently afraid that their dignity may be
forfeited along with their freedom. Therefore, the claim can be made that many of our
elderly the citizens are more fearful of confinement in a nursing home than of death.
In light of the fact that this is a work in applied ethics, the reader should note
that I am not speaking of the elderly in abstraction but rather of flesh and blood
individuals. For example in 1999, 1.6 million elderly individuals were long term
residents of America’s nursing homes, while another 2.5 million were discharged after
only a short term stay (Barton, 2003). It is the experience of the long term residents of
nursing homes that I am concerned with in this work. Given that focus, certain
sociological implications can be drawn from my philosophical analysis of the nursing
home.
Besides my status as a philosopher, I have been both a certified nursing assistant
and an instructor in several nursing school programs. Based on that experience, I have
frequently heard the following comments in relation to possible confinement in a nursing
home. “I do not want to spend my last days in a nursing home. Just let me die at home
with my dignity.” “They treat me like I am not a person,” is a common complaint. It is a
view that I myself hold after having worked as a nursing assistant for 4 ½ years. It is also
a view that is commonly held by the practicing nurses in my bioethics classes. The
nursing home is viewed with repugnance even though Medicare, Medicaid, and private
insurance companies annually pay out enormous sums of monies to nursing homes for
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the care of the elderly. Why is it the case that despite enormous financial investment and
government regulations in nursing home care our elderly citizens often find their
experience of the nursing home dehumanizing? It is my position that this view is based
in large part on the fear of becoming objectified and the consequent loss of one’s dignity.
My overall goal is to identify the characteristics of the nursing home which lead
to the erosion of personhood and provide, based on Kantian ethics, some practical
suggestions for a possible resolution of the problem of objectification. In other words, it
is my intention to provide the ethical framework for the development of a specifically
Kantian nursing home. I believe this project is of value because despite our best policy
efforts and financial commitment to the care of the elderly the erosion of self that occurs
among those confined within our nation’s nursing homes remains a primary ethical
concern in gerontology.
The Nursing Home
Organizational Structure and Staffing
In the beginning of the 20th century Americans died of acute illnesses. However,
with the advent of medical technology many more elderly Americans are living longer
and longer with disabling chronic illnesses. Socioeconomic changes in American life
such as increased life expectancy and more women working outside the home have
created a demand for a long term care provision in our health care system. Phoebe
Barton (2003) defines long term care (LTC) as “an array of services provided in an array
of settings to individuals who have lost some capacity for independence due to injury,
chronic illness or condition” (p.349). The determination that an individual requires LTC
is made based on two standard measures: ADL (activities of daily living) and IADL
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(instrumental activities of daily living). ADLs include such things as bathing, eating,
mobility, and ability to utilize bathroom facilities. IADLs include such things as
preparing meals, doing housework, paying bills, and taking medications (Barton, 2003).
It is estimated that about 12 million Americans require LTC (Barton, 2003). It is
significant to note that LTC is provided in a variety of settings by both formal and
informal caregivers. Also, that about 50% of those requiring LTC are below the age of 65
(Barton, 2003).
The nursing home is only one aspect of LTC, but in 1999 nursing homes were the
place of residence for 1.6 million elderly recipients of LTC. (Barton, 2003) Nursing
homes are classified as either “skilled” or “intermediate” care providers depending on the
medical needs of its residents. They are distinct from acute care, such as hospitals,
because they provide long term care for an indefinite period for those suffering from
chronic illness or debilitating accidents. Although they may employ occupational and
speech therapists, the primary care givers are nurses and certified nursing assistants. The
organizational structure of the nursing home includes the nursing home administrator
who has a business background, the director of nursing who oversees all aspects of
nursing care, a medical doctor who acts as the house doctor, charge nurses who oversee
the nursing department on a given shift, medication nurses, treatment nurses, certified
nursing assistants, social workers, an activities director, dining services, maintenance
workers, and cleaning personnel. Of these individuals the floor nurses and certified
nursing assistants provide direct patient care. As George Agich (2003) points out, the
workers themselves are often exploited. This seems to be more of a concern in for-profit
nursing homes because accumulating capital is the bottom line. Because of staffing
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shortages, nurses often work mandated double shifts with minimal staffing. Their jobs
include providing assistance with ADLs and IADLs and frequently being the recipient of
verbal and physical abuse from the residences. However, from the perspective of this
dissertation the exploitation of nursing home workers is significant only insofar as it
contributes to the objectification of the nursing home resident.
Federal guidelines establish the employment criteria for direct care staff as well as
others. Nurses are required to have a RN or LPN certificate and licensure. Certified
nursing assistants are required to undergo training and must be licensed. State laws, based
on an equation which divides the number of residents by the number of staff, establish the
number of hours of care required for each resident. Although most states require from
2.3 hours and upward, it has been observed that residents may receive as little as 1.7
hours of care per day (Barton, 2003).
Largely due to understaffing, the physical nature of the job, the pay rate, and
mandatory overtime, there is a high turnover rate of employees, particularly nursing
assistants. There is also a significant amount of physical and verbal abuse of residents by
nursing staff, enough in fact, that the law requires mandatory reporting of abuse and
criminal background checks for employees.
In summary the nursing home’s primary function is to provide both skilled and
unskilled nursing care to residents who lack varying degrees of independence. Beginning
in the 1960’s with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, the nursing home became
increasingly regulated by the federal government. Yearly surveys are conducted by State
Departments of Aging to guarantee that state and federal regulations are upheld. Despite
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the numerous state and federal regulations, legal practices specializing in nursing abuse
continue to grow in number along with newspaper reports of abuse and neglect.

Nursing Home Residents
As previously stated the residents of nursing homes are individuals who through
illness or accident have lost some degree of independence and require LTC. A majority
of nursing home residents are elderly and suffer from a variety of chronic disabilities.
Some of those illnesses include stroke, cancer, and various forms of dementia. Alzheimer
patients are increasing in number and are generally housed on separate units of a nursing
home because of the special problems they present in terms of care and confinement.
With respect to autonomy and cognitive ability, nursing home residents range from those
capable of fully autonomous actions to those, such as PVS (persistent vegetative state)
residents, who lack any capacity for autonomy. Nursing home residents also require
various forms of medical technology from simple feeding tubes and oxygen concentrators
to dialysis machines and respirators. For the most part those in need of LTC will spend
the remainder of their lives confined to a nursing home because of their physical or
mental dependence either on technology or nursing staff. In light of that fact, I contend
that the primary ethical concern is to ensure that they retain their dignity and do not
become victims of objectification.
Chapter Outline
The primary goals of this introductory chapter are as follows. First, I will define
objectification as it applies to this dissertation. Second, I will discuss the moral evil of
objectification. Third, I will review the relevant bioethics literature. Fourth, I will discuss
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my contribution to the ethical discussion in this area by identifying three characteristics
of nursing homes which I hold are major contributing factors that create an environment
conducive to objectification. Finally, I will argue that an unpacking of the “ends”
formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative provides a theoretical framework for
the creation of a just nursing home.
Objectification
For the purpose of this dissertation objectification refers to any circumstance in
which a human being is treated as if he or she were a non-person. When the latter occurs,
the individual is seen as an object that lacks dignity and autonomy. This notion of
humanity or personhood is of course a Kantian way of understanding personhood. For
those who reject the Kantian idea of personhood, it is my hope that this dissertation may
convince them of the value of deontology. Although the Kantian concept of personhood
is not universally endorsed, I believe that adopting a Kantian concept of personhood is
both appropriate and justifiable within the context of contemporary American society.
Martha Nussbaum (1995) identifies seven notions that she claims can be involved
in the idea of treating a person as an object:
1.

Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool
of his or her own purposes.

2.

Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as
lacking in autonomy and self-determination.

3.

Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in
agency, and perhaps also in activity.
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4.

Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as
interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type,
and/or (b) with objects of other types.

5.

Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in
boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to
break up, smash, break into.

6.

Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something
that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.

7.

Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as
something whose experience and feelings (if any) need
not be taken into account (p.257).

Although Nussbaum is writing in an attempt to refute some of Dworkin’s claims
regarding objectification in sexual relationships, all of her notions can be applied to the
treatment of nursing home residents. It should be noted that for the purposes of this
dissertation the presence of any of Nussbaum’s notions of objectification is sufficient to
make a claim that the individual is being treated as an object. In addition, paternalism is a
form of objectification under this definition because it includes a denial of autonomy.
Further, for my purposes personhood is the opposite of objectification.
Based on my experience as a certified nursing assistant, I have observed that
objectification occurs within the context of several types of relationships that are
commonplace in a nursing home setting. The first relationship is between staff and
residents. A resident of a nursing home is often perceived and treated by the staff as
either a product on an assembly line or as the patient’s disease, e.g. the train wreck, the
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vegetable. An incident which I witnessed while I was working as a certified nursing
assistant provides an illustration of treating an individual like an object. An elderly man
whose variety of health issues required that he be turned and repositioned every two
hours to avoid the development of decubitus ulcers was in fact developing decubitus
ulcers. In order to determine that he was being repositioned, the nursing home
administrator attached a post-it sticker on the man’s back which read “When you turn
him come and see me.” The administrator as objectifier was clearly treating the man as a
tool for her own purposes. I was so outraged when another nursing assistant told me
about the incident that I ran to her office and began lecturing her on the moral evils of
treating a person as a means. Of course it fell on deaf ears. That particular incident
persuaded me to shift my dissertation focus away from the treatment of prison inmates to
the treatment of nursing home residents. I came to feel the nursing home residents were
actually experiencing a greater degree of degradation and objectification than prison
inmates. Unfortunately, unlike prison inmates who can riot if pushed too far the frail
nursing home residents are truly defenseless.
The view of the resident as an assembly line commodity is perhaps best
understood within the language of nursing assistants discussing their daily assignments.
“How many do you have today?” How many are showers? How many are weighs?” The
resident is no longer a person or an individual, but instead she or he becomes an assembly
line commodity to be dealt with in a timely and efficient manner. They are a job to be
completed.
The second relationship in which objectification may occur is between the
resident and his/her physician. Again I have a vivid memory of an incident which
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occurred while I was working as a certified nursing assistant. A woman who was
virtually paralyzed from the neck down with the exception of one hand developed an
infection in her contracted hand. The infection was of course the result of inadequate
care. The orthopedic surgeon she saw suggested to her that she couldn’t use the hand so
he might as well just amputate it. She refused. In discussing the incident with me, she
explained that she had feelings, and he had made her feel like a piece of meat. For
whatever reasons, physicians often tend to deny the autonomy and subjectivity of long
term care patients. They speak to staff and family about the medical condition of the
residents without even acknowledging their presence. This is of course both a denial of
autonomy and subjectivity and in this sense the physician becomes an objectifier.
The relationship between a resident and his or her family can also result in
objectification of the nursing home resident. Once an individual reaches a state of
diminished autonomy and a family member is granted proxy consent the resident is often
treated as if he or she is the property of his or her family. In this circumstance it is the
wishes of the family that are honored. The resident’s own wishes are pushed aside and
she is forced to abide by the decisions of her family. Another incident which I witnessed
as a nursing assistant demonstrates this concept of ownership; an ownership which I
would argue is derived from an abuse of proxy consent. An elderly gentleman who had
suffered a stroke which left him confined to a wheelchair loved to feed the birds.
However, his wife forbade the staff to let him go outside and feed the birds. There did not
seem to be any legitimate reason to deny his wish to feed the birds except for his wife’s
objections. Obviously in this case the individual’s desires and wishes are ignored as if
they were non-existent. The ethical question as I see it hinges on the question of how and
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why his wife’s wishes take precedence over what is in the best interest of the patient.
That is to say how does proxy consent become an expression of property rights?
Still another example of abuse of proxy consent that remains vivid in my mind
also occurred while I was working as a certified nursing assistant. A woman I frequently
cared for and had grown fond of vehemently objected to wearing her dentures. She had
lost considerable weight and they were in fact too big for her. She attempted to rid herself
of them in various ways, including wrapping them in napkins and throwing them in the
trash. Despite her best efforts, however, they were returned time and again and on her
daughter’s insistence they were glued into her mouth with Polident denture adhesive.
Ultimately, I decided to dispose of them myself in the Giant Eagle dumpster. The woman
admittedly had diminished cognitive capacity but she was alert and oriented. Yet her
daughter was able to control every aspect of her life simply because she had proxy
consent. The woman had become an object of her daughter’s complete control with no
regard for her desires or wishes.
Finally residents as a result of the perception others hold of them and their
diminished physical and mental abilities may begin to deny their own subjectivity. They
become in Hill’s terms (1973) servile. His notion of a servile person “is one who tends to
deny or disavow his own moral rights” (p.699). Hill’s notion of a servile person will be
discussed in greater detail latter. In this circumstance the individuals begin to objectify
themselves in the sense that they themselves see themselves as less than a person.
I believe that the above-mentioned family scenarios frequently occur because we
as a society mistakenly view family relationships from a Leave it to Beaver perspective.
In other words, we view the family as a caring loving entity that makes decisions in the
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best interest of the family member. Therefore, there are very few regulations placed on
the decisions that can be made by the individual with proxy consent with regard to the
care and treatment or lack of for a nursing home resident. The consequence of this
frequently mistaken perception of the family often leads to an unregulated use of proxy
consent that all too often leads to the objectification of the nursing home resident. People
become things to do with as the individual with proxy consent desires. Good care and
respectful treatment is contingent on the existence in this case of benevolent staff and an
individual with proxy consent who attempts to act in place of and on behalf of the
resident.
The Moral Evil of Objectification
There is a substantial amount of literature both philosophical and nonphilosophical dealing with the moral evil of objectification. In order to illustrate my point
that objectification is an intrinsic evil, I have drawn on a wide variety of literature which
addresses the issue of objectification. I have intentionally chosen to review literature that
addresses differing aspects of human relationships and differing notions of
objectification. While they differ in content the common thread among them is the claim
that objectification results in loss of dignity and self-respect. The question of
objectification and the loss of self-respect and dignity occur in the writings of such
diverse authors as Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hill, Jr., Erving Goffman, W.E. B. DuBois,
and Andrea Dworkin, to name only a few.
Kant in the Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) argued:
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always as at the same time as an end
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“(p33). This formulation of the categorical imperative assumes Nussbaum’s notions of
instrumentality and denial of autonomy as forms of objectification. To treat persons as
means for Kant is to deny their rationality, dignity and intrinsic value. To treat persons as
ends requires that we respect their autonomy and subjectivity. Objectification violates
what Kant (1785) has called the ultimate principle of morality and as such it is a moral
evil. The objectifier is acting immorally.
In Servility and Self-Respect, Hill (1973) develops the Kantian theme that we
have duties to ourselves. Hill (1973) defines the servile person as “one who tends to deny
or disavow his own moral rights because he does not understand them or has little
concern for the status they give him” (p.699). In arguing that servility is a moral vice,
Hill introduces three examples of servility: Uncle Tom, Self-deprecator, and the
Deferential Wife. Hill argues that Kant equates respect for persons with respect for moral
law. The moral defect of servile individuals is that they fail to respect themselves and
therefore to respect others. In Hill’s argument there are various notions of objectification,
but for our purposes it is Self-deprecators who deny their own subjectivity that holds the
most significance. That is because the conditions of the nursing home are such that it is
often the case that a resident becomes a Self-Deprecator.
In arguing that institutions can create certain types of individuals Goffman (1961)
in Asylums introduces the concept of “mortification of self.” He contends, “that total
institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil society have the role of
attesting to the actor and those in his presence that he has some command over his
world-that he is a person with “adult” self-determination, autonomy, and freedom of
action” (p.43) Although Goffman (1961) was not directly speaking of nursing homes, he
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defined a total institution, “as a place of residence and work where a large number of
like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time,
together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (p. Xii). Clearly this
definition includes the contemporary nursing home. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that
the same characteristics Goffman observed at St. Elizabeth’s and other total institutions
would apply to the nursing home.
Goffman noted that admission to a total institution results in a severance from
one’s civil self. A process of mortification is one in which the severance from one’s self
can result in anxiety and psychological stress. However, it should be noted that he did
observe relief based on that severance in some guilt ridden individuals. According to
Goffman, the new self that emerges is an institutional self. In other words, the mental
hospital creates the mental patient and the civil self becomes the institutionalized self
who lacks autonomy and control of his/her world. Likewise the nursing home creates the
nursing home resident whose personhood is eroded as a consequence of that severance
with his/her civil self.
In another area of human interaction and reflecting on the plight of African
Americans in white America, DuBois (1903) in The Souls of Black Folk recounts a story
of his youth in which a white girl refused the greeting card he offered her simply because
he was black. DuBois suggests that this created a veil around the white world which shut
him and other blacks out. It created a “double consciousness” which forced him to see
himself through the eyes of the white world: a world in Nussbaum’s terms that denies his
autonomy and subjectivity. DuBois argues that this creates a prison around the black man

16
which in some individuals results in hopelessness and a feeling of degradation. The white
world as objectifier rejects the black man’s autonomy and subjectivity.
While DuBois addressed the unequal relationship between blacks and whites,
Dworkin (1974) in Woman Hating suggests that once there is an initial denial of
autonomy, instrumentalization and ownership occur and a woman’s “body is a body, in
the same way that a pencil is a pencil, a bucket is a bucket” (p.62) The woman becomes
an object; a non-autonomous being. She is a thing, an object to be owned and possessed.
This objectification robs her of her dignity and personhood.
In spite of the fact that the above-mentioned authors phrase their articles in
different perspectives (philosophy, sociology, and feminist literature), there is a common
agreement among them that objectification is a moral evil because it harms innocent
individuals by de-humanizing, degrading, and robbing them of their dignity. Therefore, if
it is the case as I have claimed that objectification occurs within the nursing home then
we as society have a moral imperative to address and resolve the characteristics of
nursing homes that create an environment conducive to objectification.
Bioethics Literature
Most of the bioethics literature that addresses nursing homes does not specifically
address the issue of objectification, but rather focuses solely on the notion of autonomy.
This is understandable for two reasons. First, since the Helsenki Declaration and the
Nuremburg Code, the primary ethical concern in western medicine has been voluntary
informed consent, which assumes the autonomous nature of the individual. Second, the
Belmont Principle of respect for persons drawn from Kantian ethics has been reduced to
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respect for autonomy. Therefore, discussions about autonomy hold a central place in
bioethics discussions.
George Agich’s (1993) Autonomy and Long-Term Care and his revised work
Dependence and Autonomy in Old Age (2003) remain the seminal work on addressing the
issue of autonomy in long term care. Agich suggests that there is a dissonance between
the liberal view of the autonomous independent person and the frail dependent elderly
long term care resident. He argues that what is needed is a phenomenologically reinterpreted view of autonomy that is applicable to long term care and includes
dependence as an aspect of autonomy. In developing his ethical framework for long term
care, Agich wants to shift the focus of autonomy away from the liberal view of
independence to the actual long term care setting where he sees dependence as a part of
autonomy. Therefore, Agich’s work is not so much an analysis of the nursing home and
its characteristics that foster the erosion of personhood, but rather he argues that perhaps
a new notion of autonomy is needed in the area of long term care.
Another equally significant work in the area of long term care and autonomy is
Charles Lidz, Lynn Fischer, and Robert Arnold’s The Erosion Of Autonomy In LongTerm care (1992). The authors provide an observational study of two types of long term
care and suggest that the organizational structure of the institutions leads to the erosion of
autonomy. They like, Agich, believe that what is needed is a fundamental re-thinking of
our notion of autonomy as it applies to long term care. Like him, they also provide
concrete suggestions on ways to increase the autonomy of elderly long term care
residents.

18
Both of these works provide invaluable suggestions on increasing autonomy
among the elderly confined in long term care facilities and I will address them in detail in
Chapters Three and Four. Because their focus is primarily on autonomy, they tend to do
two things. First, they neglect the other notions of objectification. For example they do
not address instrumentality and denial of subjectivity. Second, they wrongly reduce
Kant’s notion of respect for persons to respect for autonomy. Further, I believe that denial
of autonomy is too limited a notion to account for Agich’s (2003) own image of long
term care:
Long-term care seems to hang like a pall covering the inevitable coffin that
awaits us all. Surprisingly in our culture it is less death than long-term care that
strikes us as so repugnant (p.2)
Repugnant I agree, but it is more than just denial of autonomy that results in
repugnance. Rather I would argue that it is the objectification of the nursing home
resident in all Nussbaum’s notions of objectification that results in repugnance. It is a
denial of the resident as a subject or person who has lived a life full of experiences. It is a
denial of the nursing home resident as a unique person one who is not interchangeable
with other objects and who has boundaries which it is wrong to violate. I contend that it is
objectification in Nussbaum’s broader sense, rather than, in the narrow sense held by
most bioethicists who reduce objectification to loss of autonomy, that creates the
repugnance.
In light of my claim, I would suggest that a broader and more detailed focus on
the characteristics of nursing homes that tend to foster not only denial of autonomy, but
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instrumentality, violability, denial of subjectivity, and ownership, is needed to fully
understand the repugnance that is felt.

Cruel and Unusual Treatment
One characteristic of the nursing home which is often ignored is the lack of a
constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment. While we
have a concept of cruel and unusual punishment, we do not have a concept of cruel and
unusual treatment. I was first introduced to this distinction by Jeffrie Murphy (1985) in
his work Punishment and Rehabilitation. The idea of cruel and unusual treatment made
an impression on me, but I never really grasped the concept of cruel treatment until I
worked as a nursing assistant. If one were to drag a prisoner out of bed at 3AM for a
forced bath, a charge of cruel and unusual punishment could surely be leveled. Yet this is
a common practice in nursing homes. No one objects because we are treating not
punishing the resident. I believe that under the guise of treatment as a good, the wishes of
the elderly resident are often overlooked because what competent person would not
choose to be treated? The lack of a concept of cruel treatment within the nursing home
fosters a paternalistic attitude among the staff. Treatment is seen as a good. It is not the
infliction of harm. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the resident unlike the prison
inmate who can file a legal motion for cruel and unusual punishment, the nursing home
resident cannot file such a claim.
As the Dax Cowart case (2000) clearly illustrates, treatment can be very cruel.
Cowart was burned over 80% of his body. Against his will, he was forced to endure
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soaking in the Clorox tank. Cowart describes the tankings: “It was like pouring alcohol
on an open wound. All I could do was scream at the top of my lungs until I would finally
pass out with exhaustion.” (p.380).

Even though Cowart was determined on psychiatric

evaluation to be competent, his treatment was continued by his mother against his wishes.
Nursing home residents are frequently forced to undergo treatments against their
wishes, which clearly deny their autonomy. I believe this occurs for two reasons. First,
treatment is seen as a good. Second, nursing home residents are in most instances
suffering from some cognitive impairment. Therefore, it is extremely easy for staff and
family to deny any degree of individual autonomy and adopt a paternalistic attitude
toward them and force unwanted treatments on them.
A Theory of Scientific Management
In the case of for-profit nursing homes, budget cuts and bundle pricing have
resulted in a decrease in the number of staff. Such reductions are often made based on the
assumption that a theory of scientific management can be applied to nursing care. In
other words a nursing home can be operated in the same manner and on the same
principles as a factory. In this case I am referring to a theory of scientific management
such as the one proposed by Frederick Taylor. Taylor focused on cost benefits analysis,
efficiency, and systemization (Robbins, 1992, p. 63-64). An example I often use in my
bioethics class is based on an analogy with General Motors. GM can determine that it
takes 2 minutes to tighten the lug nuts on the wheel of a new GM automobile. When this
same sort of factory mentality is applied to the care of nursing home residents, states such
as Pennsylvania determine that a resident is entitled to 2.3 hours of care per day. In actual
practice this can equate to a resident- to- staff ratio of 25:1. The problem is of course that
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people are not cars, and need more personal care. An additional problem associated with
the factory perspective is that understaffing creates a situation in which the resident is
viewed as a production commodity. They are seen as a project to be completed. A friend
of mine who worked as a hospice nurse recently decided to switch to a nursing home.
One major distinction between long term care and hospice care is that the hospice nurse
can spend time with an individual patient. My friend quit the nursing home after a short
period of time and returned to hospice care because she felt like she had been working in
a factory and that was inconsistent with her view of the nature of nursing. While budget
constraints are a necessary part of providing health care, determining staffing levels on
the factory model creates an environment in which there is an increased propensity to
objectify the nursing home resident.
Abuse of Proxy Consent
The final characteristic of the nursing home which I contend contributes to an
environment of objectification is proxy consent. Proxy consent by definition is legally
giving another individual the right to make medical decisions for someone who is not
competent to make them. The problem as I see it is twofold. First, proxy consent in the
nursing home is not restricted to medical decisions, but becomes all encompassing. Some
individuals may not be competent to make their own medical decisions; however, that
does not render them incompetent to make other decisions. The way that nursing homes
are organized the person with proxy consent is free to make any and all decisions
concerning a resident both medical and non-medical. One example of a non-medical
decision which I previously discussed, is forbidding an elderly gentleman to feed the
birds bread crumbs. Although it was the highlight of his day, the family member with

22
proxy consent did not find it to be an acceptable activity. The holder of the proxy
consent’s ability to make non-medical decisions results not only in a denial of autonomy,
but also in a denial of subjectivity and an affirmation of ownership. The person becomes
the property of the individual with proxy consent. This is unique to the nursing home
because people are confined there 24 hours a day often for a long period of time.
Therefore, every aspect of their life is subject to control by either the staff or the
individual with proxy consent. On the contrary in other health care circumstances, proxy
consent is limited to medical decisions. Even in the case of children it is only a temporary
circumstance until they reach a stage in their development in which it is determined that
they are capable of making their own decisions.
Another aspect of proxy consent which I found problematic in relation to
objectification is that there are no established legal guidelines and parameters for the sort
of decisions that can be made. The individual with proxy consent can decide to force or
withhold treatment without any accountability. This creates a situation in which total
control can result in an ownership notion of objectification. Although a health care
facility can request legal intervention if a decision is deemed by the medical staff as not
in the best interests of the resident, this is rarely done in the nursing home setting because
for the most part people come to nursing homes to die not to get well and go home.
Conclusion
Given the unique characteristics of nursing homes, i.e. lack of a concept of cruel
treatment, understaffing, abuse of proxy consent, the diminished capacity of many of the
residents, I believe that there exists an enormous potential for objectification of nursing
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home residents. In light of that belief, I argue that a new ethical framework for long term
care is not only necessary but a moral imperative.
It is my position that the “ends” formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative
provides the best basis for such an ethical framework. While Kantian ethics holds a
central position in bioethics, a Kantian project of developing the guidelines and
regulations for the daily treatment of nursing home residents is a project that has not been
undertaken. In the next chapter I will address what I believe are the inadequacies of
Mary Raugust’s adoption of the care perspective as the theoretical framework for the
development of a nursing home in relation to the issue of objectification. In the chapters
that follow that I will argue for the adoption of a Kantian framework based on a wider
understanding of respect for persons and finally develop “Kantian Meadows,” a nursing
home based on the unpacking of the “ends” formulation of the categorical imperative.

CHAPTER TWO
The Problem of Objectification and the Care Perspective
Introduction
In this chapter, I will develop Proposition Three. In other words, I will argue that
the care perspective does not offer an adequate theoretical framework for addressing the
problem of objectification. This argument is developed in the following manner. First, I
outline the basic tenets of the care perspective and identify the ways in which it differs
from the justice perspective. Next, I examine its application in the Kennedy Aging
Project. Based on that analysis, I argue that the care perspective is inadequate in terms of
my project because it fosters a paternalistic attitude and abandons the language of rights.
Based on my conclusion and a discussion of the justice perspective, I contend that the end
formulation of the categorical imperative does provide such a framework.
From the perspective of this dissertation, a careful review of the bioethics
literature reveals three significant characteristics. First, as Megan-Jane Johnstone (1999)
points out, bioethics is essentially medicocentric. That is, its principles are primarily
focused on the arena of physicians and grounded in the justice perspective. Therefore, the
focus of bioethics tends to be on issues of patients’ rights, rights of research subjects, and
the formulation of public policy guidelines for clinical care and biomedical research.
Second, articles authored by nurses are conspicuously absent from most bioethics
textbooks. In other words, open any college bioethics textbook and the majority of the
articles are authored by philosophers, physicians, attorneys, and theologians. Johnstone
(1999) finds this problematic because nurses, in most instances, are the primary
caregivers and she believes that they have been excluded from bioethical discussion
24
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based on the false perception that nursing is merely “the hand maiden” of medicine and
as such lacks its own professional autonomy. A further consequence of this exclusion is
that ethical issues specific to the field of nursing are neglected. For example, how should
a nurse respond if a patient asks if she is dying? Other nursing issues deal with such
questions as mandatory overtime and staffing shortages. Johnstone argues that the only
way for nurses to play an active role in bioethics discussion is to educate themselves in
the language of the bioethics discourse and establish the legitimate autonomy of nursing
as an independent profession.
Finally, very little attention has been given to avoiding the objectification of
nursing home residents. Rather the focus of the literature has been primarily on issues
associated with autonomy. I believe that these characteristics are inter-related. Nursing
homes are traditionally the domain of nurses and not physicians, and bioethics has
traditionally focused on the domain of physicians. Therefore, with the exception of
issues regarding autonomy and patients’ rights, bioethics remains silent regarding long
term care facilities. An exception is the work of Mary Raugust (2000). Raugust’s short
essay Feminist Ethics and the Workplace Values illustrates Alison Jaggar’s (2000)
criteria of feminist ethics and the basic principles of the care perspective in relation to her
practical experience with the Kennedy Aging Project. Prior to undertaking a discussion of
Raugust’s work, it is helpful to briefly discuss the basic core views of both the justice and
care perspectives.
Justice Perspective
The most prominent philosophic representatives of the justice tradition, John
Locke, Immanuel Kant, and, more recently, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, share two

26
core views. Each of them is committed to personal liberty and in terms of their
methodology each of them relies on the social contract model. Together these core views
provide the basis for individual autonomy which is one of the distinguishing features of
the justice perspective. Their concept of personhood is grounded in moral autonomy,
human rights, and dignity. The focus in this tradition is placed on fairness and equality.
Moral reasoning requires abstraction from the situation, deductive reasoning, and
application of universal moral principles. Justice is the highest moral value. The justice
perspective tends to emphasize the universals at the exclusion of the particulars.
Although there is dispute among scholars as to whether or not utilitarianism can
accommodate rights, Mill’s Essay on Liberty with its focus on individual liberty clearly
links Mill to the justice tradition. Further, Mary Wollstonecraft’s focus on the rights of
women also clearly aligns her with the justice perspective (Kittay & Meyers, 1987).
While Mill and Wollstonecraft argued for women’s rights, the work of Lawrence
Kohlberg, which is grounded in the justice perspective, suggests that women may lack
the same level of moral development achieved by men.
Kohlberg (1981) suggests that there are three stages with two levels each of moral
development. In stage 1, the pre-conventional level, fear of punishment is the primary
motivator. In stage 2, the pre-conventional level, the individual is an egoist who satisfies
his/her own needs and considers the needs of others when it benefits them. In stage 1,
conventional level, motivation is based on the good boy/good girl concept. One acts
morally to conform. In stage 2, conventional level, the motivating factor is respect for
authority and the existing social order. In stage 1, the post-conventional level, the
individual is motivated by a desire to maintain the social contract. Morality is associated
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with rights. Finally in stage 2, post-conventional level, the individual is motivated by
conscience and universal principles of justice.
In Kohlberg’s studies he found that women were less likely than men to reach
level 3 stage 2. Kohlberg’s student Carol Gilligan took exception to these findings and
suggested that women view morality from a different perspective, which she identified as
the ethics of care.
Care Perspective
In her book, In a Different Voice, Gilligan (1977) offers empirical data that
supports her hypothesis that the moral decision-making practices of women differ from
those of men. Based on her studies of women she identified a six stage series marked by
three levels of moral development. At the first level one is concerned with caring for
ones’ self in order to survive. At the second level the focus of care is toward others and
many women become self-sacrificing at this level and never move beyond that stage of
moral development. At level three there is a balance between caring for ones self and
caring for others. This is Gilligan’s highest level of moral development.
Unlike the justice perspective, the care perspective focuses on individual
situations and relationships. Interconnectedness, not equality, is the primary focus. Moral
decision making from the care perspective focuses on contextualization rather than
abstraction. The care perspective views the self as a social self enmeshed in relationships.
The primary goal of moral deliberation is to maintain those relationships. The highest
moral value is virtue rather than justice. Its focus is on interdependency and dependency
rather than independence. The care perspective fosters nurturing rather than respect for
individualism. Particulars tend to be emphasized at the exclusion of the universals.
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Diane Michelfelder (2004) in her article on technology and feminism provides the
following summary of the care perspective:
Like interpersonal ethics, feminist ethics (particularly the ethics of care) places
Particular value on our relationships with those with whom we come into
face-to-face contact in the context of familial and friendly relations. Its key
insight lies in the idea that the experience of looking out for those immediately
around one, an experience traditionally associated with women, is morally
significant, and needs to be taken into account by anyone interested in developing
a moral theory that would be satisfactory and useful guide to the moral dilemmas
facing us in all areas of life (p.277).
Michelfelder’s account of the ethics of care illustrates the importance that the care
perspective places on relationships in actual situations and its focus on caring for others
as a moral imperative.
Although Gilligan based her contentions regarding the care perspective on
empirical studies, Annette Baier (1987) argues that the care perspective is compatible
with the moral theory of David Hume. In other words Baier argues that Hume’s focus on
sentiment rather than reason is consistent with Gilligan’s findings regarding the moral
deliberations of women. Baier also argues that according to Hume the development of
character traits which deal with the relations to others are the most important virtues.
Therefore, she argues Humean moral theory is compatible with the care perspective.
Feminist philosophers argue that Gilligan’s work with the care perspective opens up a
dialogue which provides a way to eliminate what they perceive as a male bias in western
moral theory.
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It is important to note that while Gilligan’s work has opened a new dialogue
concerning the role of women’s perspective in moral decision-making, it is not the case
that all feminists are in agreement concerning what constitutes a feminist ethic.
Notwithstanding feminist disagreements, Alison Jaggar (2000) suggests three minimal
criteria which must be met for any ethical theory to be considered a feminist theory.
Jaggar’s Criteria
Jaggar (2000) argues that for an ethical theory to be considered a feminist ethical
theory it must meet three minimum criteria. First, it must be active, engaged, and
political. Second, it must be on the side of the oppressed and it must address the private
as well as the public domain. Finally, an adequate feminist theory must take the moral
experience of all women seriously. Note that Jaggar is not suggesting that the experience
be accepted without critical evaluation. According to Jaggar, only ethical theories which
meet these minimum criteria can be considered an adequate feminist theory (1989,
pp.192-194). Raugust’s essay nicely illustrates Jaggar’s points as she applies them to her
practical experience with the Kennedy Aging Project.
The Kennedy Aging Project
Raugust (2000) recounts her experience as the feminist director of the Kennedy
Aging Project. She argues that in recent years many well-educated and talented women
have left their jobs to pursue other careers because they find the values of the patriarchal
workplace inconsistent with their own values. Raugust argues that there is a male bias in
the western ethical tradition which often alienates female workers.
The purpose of the Kennedy Aging Project was to teach healthcare professionals
how to deliver care to dual diagnosis individuals, that is, to individuals who are both
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elderly and mentally challenged. In her capacity as director, Raugust placed the primary
focus on providing service to her clients. However, the workplace ethic that evolved not
only fit Jaggar’s criteria for a feminist ethic it also illustrated the major principles of the
care perspective. Unlike my project, Raugust did not set out to create a care perspective
for a long term healthcare facility; rather she describes the work environment that
evolved at the Kennedy Aging Project under her direction and with a staff that shared a
similar political philosophy (2000, p.196).
After three years, Raugust argues that six ethical tenets evolved which exemplify
feminist ethics and the ethics of care. First, relationships instead of individual rights
became the priority of ethical enactment. Second, the focus was on giving and receiving
care rather than the exercise of individual autonomy. Third, interdependence rather than
individualism resulted in a leveling of status among the staff. That is to say all staff were
responsible for direct care and one’s position as an administrator did not exclude him/her
form providing direct care to a resident.
Fourth, others were seen as particular others rather than the impersonal other of
the justice perspective. Fifth, rather than the employment of abstract reasoning, decisions
were contextualized and based on particular residents. Finally, virtue rather than justice
was seen as the highest good. Raugust argues that the workplace ethic that evolved at the
Kennedy project was an embodiment of feminist ethics and as such further supports the
claim that women make moral decisions from a different perspective than their male
counterparts (2000, pp.196-199).
Clearly, there are relevant disanalogous characteristics between my project and
Raugust’s project. However, they are also analogous on many relevant characteristics.
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Given that feminist ethics is largely put forth as an alternative to Kantian ethics, I must
undertake a critical evaluation of the ethics of care in relation to my project of addressing
the moral evil of objectification of nursing home residents.
Before I do that I will briefly mention some general criticisms of the ethics of
care. There are several criticisms that can be leveled at the ethics of care in general. First,
it is descriptive rather than prescriptive. In other words it is premised on the naturalistic
fallacy that it is acceptable to go from “it is the case” to “it ought to be the case.” Of
course this also applies to Raugust’s work. Feminist such as Hilde Lindeman (2004) have
countered this criticism by suggesting that there are normative aspects of feminist theory
and that it is not necessarily descriptive. Others challenge the legitimacy of the
naturalistic fallacy itself.
Another criticism that may be leveled at the ethics of care in general is that it is
engendered relativism. In other words, care ethics appears to be making the claim that
morality and moral decision-making is relative to one’s gender. Finally, the question can
be posed as to whether or not the care perspective approach to ethical decision making is
the consequence of gender or socialization. However, the critical discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of my project. In relation to feminist ethics in general and the
ethics of care specifically, my only concern is whether it provides an adequate ethical
theory. That is, one that maintains the subjectivity of the nursing home resident while
simultaneously avoiding objectification.
It is my position that the ethics of care is inadequate in terms of my project
because of the following three reasons. First, it promotes a paternalistic or perhaps more
accurately a maternalistic attitude toward the resident/ nurse relationship which creates
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the potential for the nursing home resident to be seen as an object of care, that is,
dependent and child like. Second, there is the false assumption that face-to-face relations
result in a caring relationship. And finally, the lack of concern for residents’ rights and
the shift away from justice as the highest moral value to virtue tends to undermine human
dignity because the quality of care provided is contingent on the caregiver.
Priestly Model
In Robert Veatch’s classic expose of the possible models of patient/physician
relationships he introduces four possible models of physician-patient relationships: the
priestly model, the engineering model, the collegial model, and the contractual
model. He describes the priestly model as the traditional paternalistic relationship
between the patient and his/her physician in which the primary decision maker is the
physician (1986, pp.56-59). If we apply Veatch’s models to the relationship between the
nurse and resident in the Kennedy Aging Project, I maintain that the priestly model is the
most accurate description of that relationship. The acknowledged flaw in this model is
that the patient has very little input regarding their healthcare decisions. The issue of
patient’s rights is absent from the priestly model just as the focus on individual rights
was replaced by a focus on care in the Raugust project. This is problematic for my project
because it creates a situation in which care is viewed as the primary good and not
patients’ rights. It therefore creates a potential for cruel and unusual treatment and
possible lying to the resident justified on the basis of providing care.
The nurse as caregiver believes that providing care is in the best interest of the
resident and not upholding their individual right to refuse treatment. Therefore, it is a
common occurrence for medications to be administered in apple sauce or pudding
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without acknowledging the presence of that medication to the resident. Further, a 3AM
whirlpool bath becomes acceptable because one is providing care. I maintain that in
situations such as the ones described above, it is the caregiver who becomes the judge of
what constitutes care and not the resident. This occurs because the focus in the ethics of
care views caring as a good. Therefore, the failure of the ethics of care to acknowledge
the language of rights creates a potential for the nursing home resident to become an
object of care rather than a person with dignity and intrinsic value.
Face-to Face Relationships
Another problem as I see it with the ethics of care is that it assumes that face-toface relationships result in the establishment of caring relationships. After having worked
as a healthcare Aid for 4 1/2 years this seems to me to be another example of a Leave It
To Beaver view of the world and human relationships. An experience I had with a man I
will call Mr. G illustrates the point that not all face-to-face relationships result in caring.
Mr. G by all accounts was a mean-spirited individual. He was abusive to his family and
the staff. For example he had over the years physically and verbally abused his wife and
daughter. Therefore, they rarely came to visit him. In terms of his treatment of staff, he
threw urinals full of urine at aids, and verbally abused a number of staff members with
degrading and often racist slurs, and had at times physically struck an aid. This face-toface relationship resulted not in any empathy or sentiment toward Mr. G. but in fact in
extreme dislike and an unwillingness by the staff to provide care for Mr. G.
Unfortunately I was assigned Mr. G. and I will admit I loathed the man, but I also
believed that I had a moral obligation to treat him with respect and provide the necessary
care. I remember telling Mr. G. “I do not like you and you do not like me, but I will treat
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you with respect and you will treat me with respect.” I took care of Mr. G. for several
years and although he came to like me as a person I was never able to overcome my
loathing of him. While I was able to provide him with an acceptable level of nursing care,
I never did care for him. The point of this example is to illustrate to the reader that not all
face-to-face relationships result in a caring relationship or any sort of sentiment. Further,
I would argue that in such cases the ethics of care is inadequate because it assumes an
empathy or sentiment results from face-to-face relations. In other words, under the ethics
of care it would appear that Mr. G’s quality of healthcare care is contingent on the
individual staff member’s relationship with him. In instances when that relationship does
not result in caring on the part of the staff his healthcare would suffer if the staff member
did not make her decisions regarding his care based on another ethical perspective. In
light of that consideration, I maintain that, in instances like the one I encountered with
Mr. G., the impersonal justice perspective provides a more adequate framework for
providing care based on a moral obligation of justice. Thus a shift in focus from rights to
providing care undermines human dignity and by implication one’s self-esteem. Joel
Feinberg addresses the relationship between rights and human dignity.
Nowheresville
In his thought experiment concerning the value of rights, Feinberg (1970)
introduces the reader to a place called Nowheresville. In Nowheresville there is
benevolence, sympathy, and compassion. The people are virtuous. Kindness and
compassion are the norm. Nowheresville is by all accounts a very pleasant place where
people help one and other are charitable, kind, and compassionate. By analogy,
Nowheresville is similar to the Kennedy Aging Project. What is missing in Feinberg’s
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Nowheresville is the concept of rights. Nowheresvilleans do not have rights. The rewards
given to the residents of Nowheresville are contingent on the benevolence of others. As
Feinberg points out Nowheresville would have little appeal for Kant. I would like to
remind the reader that in Raugust’s Kennedy Aging Project the primacy of the notion of
rights has been replaced by the primacy of the notion of care. The issue Feinberg raises
in regards to the notion of rights is whether or not the absence of a notion of rights is
morally significant? Feinberg (1970) argues in regard to the moral significance of rights :
They are especially sturdy objects to “stand upon,” a most useful sort of
moral furniture. Having rights, of course, makes claiming possible: but it
is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance. This feature
of rights is connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is
like to be a human being. Having rights enables us to “stand up like men,”
to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of
anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but
properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be
worthy of the love and esteem of others. Indeed, respect for persons (that
is an intriguing idea) may be respect for their rights, so that there cannot
be the one without the other: and what is called “human dignity” may be
simply the recognizable capacity to assert claims. To respect a person
then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think
of him as a potential maker of claims (pp. 69-70).
As Feinberg points out human dignity and respect for persons is tied to the
language of rights and claiming. I agree with Feinberg that rights are a kind of moral
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furniture that allows one to assert their intrinsic value. The notion of rights enables me to
claim that “By the nature of my personhood I have equal moral value. I am a subject not
an object.” In contrast, the lack of a notion of rights makes my moral value contingent on
conditions external to myself. That is I am not valuable in and of myself but only if some
one else values me. For example, in feminist writings that deny the abortion debate
should be grounded in the language of rights and the question of personhood, the moral
status of the fetus is contingent on the fetus’ relationship to the mother. In other words,
the fetus has moral value only if the mother chooses to carry the fetus to term. The fetus
has moral value because of her relationship to her mother. That value is extrinsic not
intrinsic. There is no discussion of fetal rights versus the rights of the mother. The sole
determining factor of the fetus’ moral value is the relationship the mother chooses.
Independent of any judgment of the morality of abortion and without addressing
the numerous ethical issues which surround the abortion debate, i.e. personhood, the
right to privacy, I contend that the ethics of care, which disregards the language of rights,
runs the risk of undermining human dignity and therefore creates a potential for
objectification. I argue that it is precisely the turning away from the notion of rights to
embrace the ethics of care that results in the inadequacy of the care perspective to address
the goal of my project, which is to provide a safety net for maintaining personhood while
one is confined in a nursing home.
Further, although the result is the same there is a morally significant distinction
between claiming a right to something and receiving something as an act of benevolence
or charity on the part of another. The moral significance between the dignity associated
with claiming a right to something and receiving something as an act of benevolence or
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charity is perhaps better understood if we consider the difference between welfare and
social security. There are literally thousands of Americans who qualify for welfare and
Medicaid. However, many of those individuals never apply for welfare because they feel
it is demeaning and an affront to their pride to accept charity. On the other hand, few
individuals fail to claim their social security and Medicare because they feel they have a
legitimate claim to what is owed them. It is their right in a way that welfare is not. In the
case of Mr. G. the notion of rights enables him to claim his right to care independent of
any relationship he establishes with his care givers simply because it is his right.
These considerations support the end formulation of the Kantian categorical
imperative, with its focus on respect for persons, as a more adequate solution to the moral
problem of objectification in the nursing home setting than does the ethics of care.
Because the ethics of care is grounded in relationships, it is not able to prevent the
objectification that can result when an individual is viewed as an object to be cared for
rather than as a person who has the right to accept or refuse care.
I would like to point out to the reader that I am in no way disregarding the
contribution of feminist ethics to the western tradition nor am I arguing that it is not a
legitimate ethical approach. I am merely suggesting that in terms of my project of
avoiding objectification in the nursing home setting, the end formulation of the Kantian
categorical imperative provides a more tenable ethical framework. Further, that is not to
say that I am suggesting that the two ethical theories are mutually exclusive. On the
contrary I contend that they should inform one another. In other words, justice should be
tempered with compassion, persons require faces, women’s moral experience must be
considered, and oppression based on gender must be opposed.
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Finally, my goal in the following chapter is to address the criticism that Kantian
ethical theory is purely formal and lacks content. My intent is to unpack the end
formulation of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate that it does in fact have
content. Furthermore, that content is applicable to developing guidelines for establishing
a Kantian nursing home that provides care, and is also invaluable in providing guidelines
which create an environment that is not conducive to the moral evil of objectification.

Chapter Three
Unpacking the End Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
Introduction
In this chapter I will develop Propositions Four and Five. First, I argue that we
have an indirect duty to treat non-rational humans “as if they are persons.” This argument
is based on an analogy with Kant’s argument regarding our treatment of animals. It is
important to the development of my overall thesis because it demonstrates that the end
formulation of the categorical imperative has implications for nursing home residents
who lack rationality. In developing Proposition Five, I argue for two positions. First, the
end formulation of the categorical imperative prohibits coercing, lying or manipulation of
nursing home residents. Second, it imposes a duty upon a nursing home to avert obstacles
to autonomy. I contend that combined these two positions suggest guidelines for
developing a just nursing home.
In the Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785/1964), Kant instructs us
that we have duties both to ourselves and others:
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end (p.96).
This formulation of the categorical imperative referred to by Kant as the Formula of the
End in Itself (End Formulation) argues that we should never treat ourselves and others as
merely a means and we should respect ourselves and others as an end. This is the case for
Kant because personhood is defined in terms of rationality.
39
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A person, in Kantian terms, is a rational, autonomous, moral agent. Rational beings have
absolute intrinsic value. They are capable of establishing objective goals and choosing
appropriate means to achieve those goals. Their actions are not determined by instinct.
Therefore, they are an end in itself and provide the basis of determinate law. In other
words, persons are lawgivers. Rationality and the ability to develop objective ends that
apply universally to all rational beings provides the basis for Kantian ethical theory and
the Supreme Principle of morality the Categorical Imperative.
In light of the Kantian criteria for personhood, some readers may challenge my
application of the end formulation of the categorical imperative as the basis for
development of a just nursing home. Such a challenge undoubtedly will arise from the
fact that not all nursing home residents are rational. Therefore, some nursing home
residents are not part of the Kantian moral community, i.e. non-persons.
Clearly, that is the case. In any nursing home there is a continuum of rationality
which spans both ends of the spectrum from the rational to the PVS patient (persistent
vegetative state) who lacks all capacity for consciousness and therefore rationality. It is
my intention to take this challenge by the horns and address it head on without any
waffling on my part. I will undertake the issue of non-rational human beings before
proceeding to unpack the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the
categorical imperative.
Kantian Ethics and Animals
Based on an analogy with Kant’s argument regarding our indirect duty not to act
cruelly toward animals, I contend that we do in fact have an indirect moral duty to treat
non-rational human beings “as if they were persons.” Simply stated my argument is that:
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If we treat non-rational human beings as “mere means” it will harm our own humanity in
the same way that cruelty to animals harms our own humanity. Therefore, we have an
indirect duty to treat all human beings “as if they are persons.”
Although Kant obviously did not address the question of PVS patients, he did
address the issue of our duties to animals in his Lectures on Ethics (1770’s/1963). Before
addressing Kant’s position on animals, I would like to make a few comments about the
Lectures. Although the Lectures were not written by Kant, but rather transcribed either by
or for three of his students, they provide a valuable insight into Kant the beloved
professor and his passion for ethics. As Lewis Beck (1963) points out, the Lectures allow
us to see Kant the eloquent speaker who often brought his audience to tears. Beck also
argues, and I agree, that without reading the Lectures and the Metaphysics of Morals and
seriously considering Kant’s handling of the other components of a good person, one may
erroneously hold that for Kant a moral person is reducible to an emotionless “thinking
machine,” a robot (pp xii-xiii).
In the Lectures Kant argues that while we have no direct duties to animals, we do
have indirect duties to ourselves to refrain from cruelty to animals. These indirect duties
are grounded in our duty to our own humanity. In other words because animals are not,
from Kant’s perspective, rational we have no direct duties toward them. However, we do
have an indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals because cruelty to animals
damages our own humanity:
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer
capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog,
for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages
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in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards
mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes
hard in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his
treatment of animals (p. 240).
In other words, for Kant we have a duty to preserve our own human feelings and
therefore an indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals. This is the case because Kant
believes that in many instances animal behavior is analogous to human behavior and
cruelty to animals diminishes our empathy for their suffering and likewise our empathy
for humans which is necessary in our relationships with other human beings. Kant
addresses this issue again in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797/1996):
With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and
cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s
duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared
feelings of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural
predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with
other men (pp.192-193).
It appears that Kant is suggesting that a compassionate predisposition toward fellow
humans aids an individual in her moral duty. It is important to remember that for Kant
(1770’s/1963) duties to ones’ self take precedence over our duty to others:
A man who performed his duty to others badly, who lacked generosity,
kindness, and sympathy, but who nevertheless did his duty to himself
by leading a proper life, might yet possess a certain inner worth; but
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he who has transgressed his duty towards himself, can have no inner worth
whatever (p118).
Therefore to engage in actions and activities which degrade one’s own humanity is for
Kant a serious moral offense. For example, we have a Perfect Duty not to kill ourselves.
Two questions may be raised in relation to Kant’s position. First, is it a valid
claim? Second, does the claim apply equally well to non-rational human beings? My
answer is affirmative in both instances. First, let us investigate the empirical support for
his claim that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans.
It is interesting to note that there is significant empirical evidence which supports
Kant’s claim that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans. For example, various
humane societies have conducted research and published statistics on the link between
animal and human abuse (American Humane Society, Humane Society of the United
States, Doris Day Animal League etc.). Research on serial killers suggests that one shared
commonality among them is a history of cruelty to animals. The infamous serial killers
Jeffrey Dahmer, Albert DeSalvo, and David Berkowitz all had a history of animal abuse
(Briggs, 1994, pp24-28).
In addition, in the Columbine case it is known that both Harris and Klebol
abused animals before turning their guns on their classmates (psyeta.org). Some states
consider the evidence of the correlation between animal abuse and human abuse strong
enough to warrant instructions to humane agents investigating alleged animal abuse, to
check on children and seniors who reside at the address under investigation.
The investigation of the relationship between animal and human abuse is a multidisciplinary field. The field includes such diverse authors as feminist Cindy Adams
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(1995) and her paper on the relationship between battering women and animal abuse to
FBI profilers on serial killers. Available contemporary research supports Kant’s 18th
century claim that animal cruelty leads to human cruelty. Kant believed that this is the
case because animal nature is analogous to human nature and cultivating kindness to
animals enables us to cultivate kindness to humanity while cruelty to animals results in
cruelty to humans. In the Lectures, Kant refers to Hogarth’s engravings entitled Stages of
Cruelty in which he sequentially depicts a child pinching a dog’s tail, a man running over
a child with a cart, and the final cruelty of murder.
Another point of interest brought up by Kant in the lectures on animals suggests
that in England during that time period butchers and doctors were banned from juries
because it was believed that their professions hardened them to death. I find this point
significant because Kant is suggesting that certain professions by their very nature can
harden individuals. In relation to the nursing profession, it is often the case that nurses
become de-sensitized to the suffering of their patients. My goal is to create in theory a
just nursing home environment in which that desensitization does not occur.
Kant further suggests that the development of tender feelings toward animals
results in the development of tender feelings toward humankind and visa versa.
Therefore, although animals are not part of the Kantian moral community our duties to
ourselves result in an indirect duty to refrain from engaging in cruelty to animals.
Kantian Ethics and Non-rational Humans
The question which I wish to pose is whether by analogy we can legitimately
extend the Kantian argument against cruelty to animals to include not treating nonrational humans such as PVS patients and other cognitively impaired nursing home
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residents as “mere means”? My position is that an extension of Kant’s argument is not
only legitimate, but that it holds true to an even greater degree in the case of non-rational
humans because there is always the possibility of personhood. In other words, treating
non-rational humans as “mere means” degrades one’s own humanity and hinders the
development of tender feelings toward humankind.
Because my position makes a claim of fact about human nature, its legitimacy is
contingent on empirical substantiation. The 20th century eugenics programs of the United
States and Germany provide support for my position. Philip Reilly’s (1999) history of
eugenic sterilization in the United States chronicles the United States’ eugenic program.
The 1880 census report alarmed many people because it reported that “whereas the
general population had grown by 30%, the apparent increase in “idiocy” was 200%
(1999, p.517). The creation of asylums for defective women in their reproductive years
was one of the first responses to this report. Although never legally implemented, several
state legislatures debated proposals for mass castration of criminals. Ultimately the
United States’ eugenics policy resulted in mandatory forced sterilization of the insane,
criminals, and the feebleminded. The Eugenics Record Office was funded by some of
America’s wealthiest families (Harriman, Kellogg, and Rockefeller). It is estimated that
between 1907 and 1963 more than 60,000 persons were sterilized (Reilly, 1999).
Perhaps the cruelest irony of the United States’ eugenics policy of forced sterilization is
that the legal case Buck v. Bell (1927) which upheld Virginia’s mandatory sterilization
laws by a vote of 8-1 was founded on a falsehood (Gould, 1999, p. 528-532). In handing
down the majority decision, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
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We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser
sacrifices….It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are
enough (1999, p529).
Justice Holmes is of course referring to Carrie Buck, her mother Emma, and her daughter
Vivian. A re-examination of the case in 1980 revealed what many had suspected, neither
Carrie Buck or her daughter were imbeciles, but rather both had normal intelligence.
How did a man who was viewed as a champion of the Bill of Rights come to hold such a
position and completely ignore the rights of Carrie Buck? Could it be the case that it was
his belief that those who are mentally challenged are defective persons and therefore can
justly be treated as a means to further the goals of society? Did that belief harden him to
the rights of Carrie Buck and degrade his own humanity? This case illustrates the danger
of labeling some people as defective persons and then assuming that they may be treated
as objects. It also, I believe, demonstrates an error in reasoning among those who hold
that designation of personhood is a privileged category. In fact personhood in Kantian
terms imposes duties on persons to act in a specific manner. Persons are not privileged in
the sense that they may treat non-persons in any manner that they choose. On the contrary
rationality and the ability to act independent of instinct imposes duties upon persons that
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cannot be meaningfully imposed on non-persons. For example, we cannot meaningfully
say of a group of beached whales that they have a moral duty not to commit suicide.
However, we can say that persons have such a moral duty. In other words, personhood is
not the assignment of privilege, but rather the assignment of responsibility.
The case of Carrie Buck, from my perspective, illustrates a misinterpretation of
personhood and the duties it implies. The German eugenics program is a further
illustration of erroneously viewing personhood as a privileged position.
In 1923 Fritz Lenz, a German geneticist and advocate of mandatory sterilization
praised the United States’ eugenics sterilization policies. Under the banner of “life
unworthy of life,” the Nazis began the forced sterilization of the feebleminded, insane,
epileptic, blind, and deaf. Their preliminary estimates called for the initial mandatory
sterilization of 410,000 persons (Liffton, 1999). Ultimately, the German eugenics
program led to the final solution and the extermination of millions of people. In
addressing the final solution, Heinrich Himmler (2004) in a speech to his SS subordinates
in 1943 suggested the following:
…in sum, we can say that we fulfilled the heaviest of tasks [destroying the Jews] in love to our people. And we suffered no harm in our
essence, in our soul, in our character (p.97).
It is of course the actions of the Nazis which resulted in the term crimes against
humanity. Can it be the case as Himmler claims that the Nazis did not degrade their own
humanity? On the contrary, I would argue that Himmler’s speech is a self-contradiction
in the sense that his lack of remorse or moral repugnance at the extermination of the Jews
reflects his lack of conscience. Himmler and the Nazis serve as evidence that cruelty to
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non-rational human beings degrades one’s own humanity and hardens one so that he or
she no longer has as Kant argued a natural predisposition to have tender feelings toward
humanity. I would like to remind the reader that the Nazis’ final solution began with
Hitler’s “useless eater policy.” The policy of first sterilizing than gassing the mentally ill
and mentally challenged ultimately led to the extermination of millions of people.
In light of the above, my point is that just as it is the case with animal cruelty
treating non-rational humans as “mere means” leads to cruelty to humankind. Therefore,
based on the end formulation of the categorical imperative we have an indirect duty to
refrain from treating non-rational human beings as “mere means” just as we do to refrain
from cruelty to animals.
The Case of Dana
I believe that the cases of a young woman who I will call Dana and an elderly
woman who I will call Ada provides the reader with a better understanding of why it is
the case that treating non-rational humans with the respect due persons benefits one’s
own humanity. First I will discuss the case of Dana. Dana and her boyfriend were coming
home from the senior prom when they were run off the road and hit a tree head on. Dana
suffered closed head trauma and never regained consciousness. I did not become
acquainted with her until several years later. At that time I was working as a certified
nursing assistant and she was assigned to my care. Dana had a tracheotomy, but she was
able to breathe on her own for short periods of time. Her mother visited her on a daily
basis. In addition to her medical needs, her daily care consisted of bathing, dressing and
being placed in a geriatric chair. Her mother often took her outside and she was provided
with outside stimuli such as television and radio.
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I always talked to her and treated her as if she were conscious as I performed her
care. In the nightstand beside her bed was a photograph of her with her dog. I still
remember the dog. It was a little brown dog and he was wearing a red bandanna. Her
mother told me how much she loved animals. It was the practice of this particular nursing
home for staff and others who were not on duty to dress up their pets and bring them to
the nursing home on Halloween. I brought my black lab Shane dressed as a cowboy. My
main reason for doing so was to introduce him to Dana. Shane was a very affectionate
and kind dog. When I took him in Dana’s room he jumped on the bed and licked her face.
She smiled and of that I am sure. Whether or not her smile was an involuntary response
to Shane’s lick or an expression of pleasure I will never know. However, what I do know
is how her smile affected me. In Kant’s terms I had tender feelings toward Dana. I
believe as Kant did that the development of tender feelings towards in this case
defenseless others develop in us “humane feelings toward mankind” that aids us in
fulfilling our moral duties. Our duties towards non-rational humans, then, “are indirect
duties towards mankind.” Therefore, we have a duty to treat the non-rational nursing
home resident “as if he or she is a person.” To treat Dana as the vegetable in room 2 may
or may not harm Dana, but it does harden the nursing staff and degrade their humanity. In
addition to the example provided by Dana’s case, the case of Ada further demonstrates
the inherent danger of treating human beings as objects.
The Case of Ada
I intentionally left my experience with Ada out of the first draft of this chapter
because it forces me to admit that despite my efforts to the contrary I am guilty of
treating a human being as an object. Ada suffered from Parkinson disease and numerous
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other ailments. She was contracted and stiff from the neck down. She was fed through a
feeding tube. Basically, she lay in the bed twenty four hours a day seven days a week.
The nursing assistant’s care of Ada amounted to turning and repositioning her, changing
her bed and giving her a whirlpool bath. We often spoke about Ada’s condition while
providing her with care. I remember saying “I would rather be dead then lying there like
that.” I assumed as did the other aids that Ada was not aware of our conversation.
However, one day I turned off her television and Ada said “leave it on.” I ran to the
nurses’ station to report that Ada could speak. I was told that they were aware that Ada
could speak. I realized that Ada had heard my comments. I ran back to apologize to her
and she told me it was okay. However from my perspective, it was not okay. I am still
bothered by my lack of concern for Ada’s feelings. I believe that my experience with Ada
reveals how easy it is to treat a human being as an object when one assumes that they are
a non-person for whatever reason.
My suggestion that our humanity is harmed when we treat human beings as “mere
means” is not without support in American culture. For example, our elaborate funeral
practices. The deceased is clearly a thing, but we show it respect. I argue that is the case
because callous treatment of the dead is harmful to our own humanity.
In the case of biomedical ethics, Americans take great care to protect the interests
of the non-rational individual. The case of Terri Schiavo illustrates this fact. Although
they disagreed, both parties (husband and family) appeared to be concerned with Terri’s
best interests. The question is why when the woman had been in a PVS state for years
was there so much public concern over the removal of her feeding tube. I maintain that
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the reason is our treatment of the Terri Schiavos of the world is a reflection on our own
humanity.
A reading of the bioethics literature on euthanasia illustrates a strong desire on the
part of humankind to distance ourselves from the Heinrich Himmler’s of the world. The
Helsinki Code with its focus on the need for proxy consent for the incompetent stands as
a testimony to the belief that the way we treat non-rational humans is a reflection of our
own humanity.
I have, I believe, clearly stated my position in regards to non-rational human
beings: We have an indirect duty, based on Kantian ethics, to treat them “as if they are
persons.” To treat them as persons means within the context of this work to uphold the
duties imposed by the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I will address the
specific application of this position within the context of the nursing home in the final
chapter. I now wish to address the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the
categorical imperative.
The Formulation of the End in Itself
Prior to unpacking the end formulation of the categorical imperative, I believe it is
helpful to comment on several key features of Kantian ethics. First, Kantian ethics is an
ethics of duty, not as some suggest an ethics of rights. Normally rights theorists argue,
based on the correlativity thesis, that rights imply duties. However, not all Kantian duties
have corresponding rights. For example there is a Kantian duty of benevolence, but there
is not a corresponding right to benevolence.
Second the focus of Kantian ethics is on motivation not consequences. Kantian
ethics is concerned with the maxims we act upon. Maxims are the underlying principles
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upon which we act. Therefore when the categorical imperative instructs us that we should
“act on only that maxim which we can at the same time will to be universal law,” Kant is
telling us that the principles upon which we act have to be universally applicable to all
persons in morally similar circumstances.
Finally, although Kantian ethics usually focuses on the actions of individuals, its
scope can be extended to institutions or organizations in which there is a decision making
body. In the present case the governing body of the nursing home or legislatures who
enact legislation that establishes the guidelines for operating a nursing home.
Kant develops the end formulation of the categorical imperative in the
Groundwork at 64-69. In regards to the end formulation, Kant tells us we have a duty not
to treat humanity either in ourselves or in others as a “mere means”. It is important to
note that Kant is saying a “mere means” because of course we all use one another as a
means in some way or another. In the case of the healthcare worker the resident is a
means of obtaining a paycheck. The nurse is a means of receiving care for the nursing
home resident. What Kant means by treating a person as a “mere means” is that through
coercion, deception or manipulation a person consents to an arrangement that she would
not otherwise consent to. Kant provides two illustrations of using one’s self or another as
a mere means (66-69). These are the Perfect Duties. His first illustration is suicide. Kant
argues that if one commits suicide to remove herself from a painful situation she is using
herself as a mere means. Therefore, persons have a Perfect Duty not to kill themselves.
Kant’s second illustration is of the individual who makes a false promise. Kant
argues that the person who makes the false promise is using the other person as a mere
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means: he intends “to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not
share” (68). Therefore, we have Perfect Duty not to lie.
Although there are numerous examples in medical research of using persons as
“mere means,” perhaps the most glaring example in the history of American medical
research of using persons as “mere means” is the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. In this
case the research subjects were coerced, manipulated, and deceived into agreeing to
participate in the Tuskegee experiment. This manipulation was possible because the
participants, due to their extreme poverty and race, were a vulnerable population. The
researchers clearly treated the study subjects as “mere means” (objects). From a Kantian
perspective, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment can be judged to be highly immoral.
In addition to the moral prohibition against using persons as “mere means,” Kant
argues that we have a duty to treat persons as “ends in themselves.” For Kant this means
that we must treat persons as rational autonomous beings. As Onora O’Neill (1993)
points out:
In doing so we must remember that (as Kant repeatedly stressed, but later
Kantians have often forgotten) human beings are finite rational beings in several
ways. First, human beings are not ideal rational calculators. We standardly have
neither a complete list of the actions possible in a given situation nor more than a
partial view of their likely consequences. In addition, abilities to assess and to use
available information are usually quite limited. Second, these cognitive
limitations are standardly complemented by limited autonomy. Human action is
limited not only by various sorts of physical barrier and inability but by further
sorts of (mutual or asymmetrical) dependence. To treat one another as ends in
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themselves such beings have to base their action on principles that do not
undermine but rather sustain and extend one another’s capacities for autonomous
actions. A central requirement for doing so is to share and support one another’s
ends and activities to some extent. Since finite rational beings cannot generally
achieve their aims without some help and support from others, a general refusal of
help and support amounts to failure to treat others as rational autonomous beings,
that is, as ends in themselves (p.262).
O’Neill suggests that Kantians are required to do what they can to remove obstacles that
limit the possibility of autonomous action. In her case she is addressing world hunger and
the duty of Kantians to do what they can to reduce hunger.
In other words the end formulation of the categorical imperative prohibits
Kantians from using persons as a “mere means” and also requires Kantians to act in such
a way that when possible they act to remove obstacles that limit the possibility of
autonomous action. As O’Neill argues in regard to world hunger and poverty, “Kantians
are required to do what they can to avert, reduce, and remedy hunger. They cannot of
course do everything to avert hunger: but they may not do nothing” (1993, p.262).
O’Neill’s position is consistent with and supported by Kant’s notion of beneficence as an
Imperfect duty:
This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with
Humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavors also, so far as
in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who
is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me,
be also, as far as possible, my ends (69).
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In other words we not only have a negative duty to refrain from treating persons as a
“mere means” but a positive duty to do what we can to promote the possibility of
autonomous action in other persons. Although the end formulation cannot provide us
with specific policies, it does provide a method of judging the justness of policies.
Policies that treat persons as “mere means” are unjust and those that promote the
possibility of autonomous action are both just and required. In that sense there is content
with determinate implications in the end formulation of the categorical imperative.
Obviously, Kantians are not required to further the ends of every person.
However, in the case of the Kantian nursing home which I will call Kantian Meadows the
special duties imposed as a consequence of the contract to provide care impose both a
legal and moral duty on the directors as well as all the care givers to further the ends of
all those individuals placed in their care. In light of the above, the next task is to identify
barriers to the possibility of autonomous action.
O’Neill (1993) primary focus is on world hunger and poverty which she claims
that Kantians must attempt to avert. Although they are not writing in relation to nursing
home residents, Henry Shue and Anita Allen suggest other obstacles to the possibility of
autonomous action that are particularly relevant to nursing home residents.
Shue (1989) in addressing the justification of human rights suggests that basic rights are a
necessary condition for the exercise of human rights (pp. 152-171). The reader may ask
how the concept of human rights is related to the possibility of autonomous action. In
discussing human rights there are three generations of human rights. The first generation
rights are liberty rights. Clearly, liberty is a necessary condition of autonomous action.
Therefore, if there are basic rights necessary for human rights, and liberty is not only a
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first generation human right but also a necessary condition for the possibility of
autonomous action, it follows that basic rights are necessary for the possibility of
autonomous action.
Shue identifies subsistence and security as basic rights. Shue argues (1989):
If any right is to be exercised except at great risk, physical security must be
protected. In the absence of physical security people are unable to use any other
rights that society may be said to be protecting without being liable to encounter
many of the worst dangers they would encounter if society were not protecting
the rights (p. 158).
That is, physical security is necessary in order for people to exercise any right. Shue
further maintains that subsistence or minimal economic security, which he defines as
“unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and
minimum preventive public health care,” is a necessary condition for the exercise of any
right (1989, p. 159).
Shue’s position on the necessity of physical security and subsistence is consistent
with O’Neill. In other words, the lack of physical security and subsistence are obstacles
to the possibility of autonomous action because persons become vulnerable to
manipulation. Anita Allen in her work suggests that privacy is a necessary condition of
personhood.
Allen (1988) writing concerning the value of privacy for women in a free
society, suggests that privacy in relation to personhood has both a person-creation and a
person-enhancement value. Allen quotes Edward Bloustein to support her contention that
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privacy has moral value. Bloustein’s (1979) observations are particularly relevant to the
nursing home setting:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or
gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of
his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges
with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be
different ; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be
conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal
warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being
although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual (p.42).
Therefore, it can be argued that the lack of privacy is also an obstacle to the possibility of
autonomous action and as such Kantians have a duty to avert it.
Allen suggests because of the moral value of privacy that institutions “that
promote individual privacy can be justified on the grounds that privacy is crucial to
sustaining and enhancing personhood in the moral sense” (1988, p.46). Individual
privacy becomes something that Kantian Meadows has a duty to promote.
While the end formulation of the categorical imperative cannot provide us with
specific policies or a way to rank policies, it does provide us with a method of judging the
morality of proposed policies; we cannot adopt policies that treat persons as “mere
means” and Kantian Meadows has a duty to avert obstacles to the possibility of
autonomous action. Based on the above discussion it may be argued that a lack of
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physical security, economic subsistence, and individual privacy constitute obstacles to the
possibility of autonomous action. Therefore, the policies of Kantian Meadows must avert
those obstacles.
Finally, in the following chapter I will construct Kantian Meadows based on the
duties imposed on Kantians by the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I will
leave it to the reader to decide the appeal or lack of appeal of Kantian Meadows after
they have read the final chapter.

Chapter Four
Kantian Meadows: A Nursing Home Dedicated to the Ethical Treatment of the
Elderly

Mission Statement
It is the philosophy of Kantian Meadows that all residents deserve to be
treated in an ethical manner. To ensure our commitment to the ethical treatment of
our residents Kantian Meadows will enact only those policies and procedures that
prohibit the treatment of residents as “mere means” and promote those policies that
treat residents as “end in themselves.”
Introduction
In this chapter I will develop Proposition Six. That is, I will develop, in theory, a
nursing home whose policies and procedures are consistent with the end formulation of
the categorical imperative. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the end
formulation of the categorical imperative does have a practical application in the
development of a nursing home. Therefore, I will argue for guidelines, procedures, and
practices that uphold the duties I argued that are imposed upon a nursing home in chapter
three.
This project is undertaken in order to guarantee that the individuals who enter the
doors of Kantian Meadows will not be subjected to the moral evil of objectification and
that the environment of Kantian Meadows will remain conducive to retention of a
resident’s dignity and personhood. It should also be remembered that Kantian Meadows
endorses the policy of treating non-rational human beings “as if they were persons.”
Now let us imagine a place called Kantian Meadows.
59
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Brief Description
Kantian Meadows, a 100 bed long term care facility, is located on 2 acres of land
in Anywhere USA. Kantian Meadows has a twenty five bed secure Alzheimer unit
complete with its own courtyard. It is a non-profit facility.
Opened in 2006, it is dedicated to the preservation of the dignity of all its residents. Its
architectural style is circular with all resident rooms facing inward toward a central
nursing station. Kantian Meadows has several professionally landscaped courtyards that
are fenced for resident security. Therefore, in most ways Kantian Meadows resembles
other American nursing homes. However, Kantian Meadows is distinct from other
nursing homes in that the end formulation of the categorical imperative serves as the
basis for judging the ethical or unethical nature of all institutional policies. In order to
guarantee that the principles of the end formulation of the categorical imperative are
upheld Kantian Meadows has in place an oversight committee. Let us, now take a more
detailed look at the organizational structure of Kantian Meadows.
Non-Profit Status
We at Kantian Meadows have chosen to become a non-profit facility because we
are concerned about the potential for a conflicts of interest had we chosen a for-profit
status. Although we are not of the opinion that there is necessarily an inherent injustice in
capitalism, we do believe that a commitment to profit maximization is not in all cases
consistent with the requirements of the categorical imperative. For example, a bottom line
of profit maximization would only require that state and federal staffing minimum
requirements are upheld. However, as will be explained later those requirements are not
sufficient if Kantian Meadows is to guarantee that residents will not be treated as “mere

61
means” and treated as “ends in themselves.” Therefore, in light of Kantian Meadows
commitment to its philosophy, a non-profit status has been chosen. In furtherance of our
philosophy we have also chosen a circular architectural design.
Architectural Design
Although the categorical imperative does not support one architectural design
over another, Kantian Meadows has chosen the circular design because within a circle
everyone is equidistance from the center and as such we believe that the design promotes
a sense of equality among our residents and visibility to the head nurse. On the other
hand, the common choice of a linear design tends to create a sense of inequality. That is,
commonly nursing homes and other institutions are constructed in such away that long
linear hallways run off the central nursing station. Therefore, a hierarchical structure is
created in which individuals may feel isolated from the group. Based on my own
experience as a nursing assistant, it is often the case that the more demanding or
troublesome residents are placed as far away from the nurses station as possible. Those
residents who occupy the rooms at the end of the hall tend to be isolated from other
residents and the activity which surrounds the nursing station. In this way there tends to
be a structurally created inequality that the choice of a circular design mitigates. Based on
this consideration, Kantian Meadows has purposely chosen a circular design in the hope
of promoting a sense of equality among our residents. The individuals who occupy
Kantian Meadows span the spectrum from those who are capable of autonomous action
to those who lack any possibility of autonomous action.
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Resident Demographics
There are only two restrictions that Kantian Meadows places on admittance. First
and foremost, we must have the ability to provide the potential resident with all necessary
care. Therefore, because of the specialized nature of caring for respirator dependent
residents, Kantian Meadows will not accept respirator dependent residents or those
individuals suffering from spinal cord injuries that require specialized care.
And of course, the second restriction is the availability of bed space on an
appropriate housing unit. That is, we would not accept someone who is not suffering with
Alzheimer disease and place him or her on an Alzheimer unit because there is an
available bed. We believe that this decision is consistent with the categorical imperative
because to do otherwise, we believe, would amount to treating the individual as a “mere
means;” a body to fill a bed.
In light of our admission criteria, the ability of autonomous action among
residents of Kantian Meadows is greatly varied. There are those residents for whom
autonomous action is possible because they suffer only from physical limitations that
prohibit independent living. A significant number of our residents have limited
autonomy. Others lack the possibility of autonomous action altogether because they
remain in a persistent vegetative state. Finally, twenty-five percent of our residents suffer
from of Alzheimer disease. This results in varying possibilities for autonomous action.
However, I would like to remind the reader once again, it has already been argued that
Kantian Meadows will treat all human beings “as if they were persons.” In order to
guarantee Kantian Meadows’ commitment to the categorical imperative is upheld, it is
necessary to establish an oversight committee.
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Configuration and Qualifications of Oversight Committee
The committee will consist of two Kantian bioethicists, two attorneys, two nurses,
two physicians, a diversity of clergy, and two pharmacists. The bioethicists will be
experts both in the area of healthcare ethics and Kantian ethical theory. Their primary
responsibility will be to ensure that the policies and procedures adopted by Kantian
Meadows are consistent with the moral duties imposed by the categorical imperative.
That is, they will ensure that no residents are treated as “mere means” and that Kantian
Meadows as much as possible averts obstacles to the possibility of autonomy. The case
of Ada discussed in Chapter Three illustrates how easily, even for Kantians, it is to treat a
person as a “mere means.” In addition, the policies and procedures of Kantian Meadows
will avoid as much as possible any policies and practices that threaten the security,
subsistence and privacy of our residents. This is the case because as discussed in Chapter
Three the lack of security, subsistence, and privacy acts as an obstacle to the possibility
of autonomous action. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to the ethical treatment
of all its residents, the bioethicists will retain the final veto power over any and all
practices. The other consideration in relation to the legitimacy of policies and practices is
of course the legal aspect.
The presence of two attorneys on the committee will ensure that those
requirements are met. One attorney’s expertise will be in the area of non-profit rules and
regulations. He or she will retain veto power over all issues relating to Kantian Meadows
non-profit status. The other attorney will be an expert in the field of healthcare law.
Therefore, he or she will be responsible for guaranteeing that all legal requirements are
met and as such will retain veto power over all issues directly relating to healthcare law.
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The purpose of the presence of clergy, physicians, and nurses on the over sight committee
is to ensure that in what Kant called the empirical realm of the sensible, the subjective
choices of non-rational residents are respected. That is, whereas the categorical
imperative functions in the intelligible realm and goals are objective, personal choice
functions in the empirical realm where goals are subjective. If the reader recalls
Nussbaum’s notions of treating someone as an object, she will be reminded of notion
number seven: Denial of Subjectivity. According to Nussbaum, this form of
objectification occurs when we fail to take someone’s feelings and experience in account
(1995, p.257). It is this aspect of personhood that bioethics has largely ignored. Given its
dedication to ensuring that its residents are not treated as “mere means,” Kantian
Meadows cannot ignore the realm of subjective goals. The problem Kantian Meadows
faces is how to decide those subjective questions in the cases in which individual
residents are either not capable or limited in their ability to express their own subjective
choices.
Best Interest Standard
In terms of health care decisions, where the individual is capable of autonomous
action the principle of voluntary informed consent will be maintained as the standard.
Admittedly, voluntary informed consent is in some ways a flawed concept. However, it is
the legal standard supported by the 1993 Patient Self Determination Act. Further, in the
case of rational residents it appears to be the most justifiable standard of respecting
resident autonomy. Autonomy within this context may be defined as allowing competent
residents to exercise their liberty. However, Kantian Meadows is not only committed to
respecting the autonomy of competent residents, it is also committed to respecting their
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autonomy after they become incompetent. Therefore, the “best interest” standard will be
adopted in the case of incompetent residents. In consideration of the fact that what is in
an individual’s best interest is not necessarily an objective medical determination, the
input of family, physicians, nurses, and clergy is needed to determine what is in the “best
interest” of a specific resident. For example, in the case of pancreatic cancer the
possibility of a cure is extremely rare. An objective medical decision dedicated to the
curative approach would recommend radiation and chemotherapy as what is in the “best
interest” of a patient. However, given the low success rate for that particular form of
cancer and the side effects of treatment someone may reasonably choose to refuse
treatment. While inconsistent with an objective medical decision, this decision is not
inconsistent with the categorical imperative. That is, while Kant prohibits suicide there is
not a prohibition against passive euthanasia. Therefore, in this case the “best interests” of
the individual suffering with pancreatic cancer might be passive euthanasia.
Another example which is actually based on the experience of my friend’s
grandmother, who I will call Athena, further illustrates the error in assuming that the
“best interest” standard is synonymous with an objective medical standard. Athena is an
elderly Greek woman who has practiced vegetarianism for over 60 years. In her late
eighties she has become the victim of Alzheimer disease and as such suffers from
cognitive impairments. She no longer eats very well and as result has become anemic.
The decision was made that in her “best interest” she should be fed iron rich meat
products. Her family was not consulted about this decision. They were extremely
disturbed to learn that their grandmother was being fed meat. Their annoyance with this
decision was based on Athena’s life long belief that it is morally wrong to kill animals.
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Obviously, in this case as in the previous example the determination of what is in the
“best interest” of Athena goes beyond a medical determination of the best medical
treatment. Therefore, in order to address the sensible realm of subjective choice the
oversight committee must include professional, religious, and gender diversity.
It should also be noted that the committee is responsible to make sure that in
determining the “best interest” of the resident they do not cross the line between
respecting the subjective choices of a resident and adopting a paternalistic approach.
Admittedly, this can be a difficult responsibility but is a necessary responsibility if the
end formulation of the categorical imperative is to be upheld.
Non-medical decision making also poses a problem for Kantian Meadows in
terms of residents with limited rationality. In order to address this issue, Kantian
Meadows will adopt the legal concept of the “reasonable person” standard.
Reasonable Person Standard
Unlike the “best interest” standard, which is utilized within the medical context,
the “reasonable person” standard is used within the legal context to determine the
justifiability of a defendant’s actions. In other words, is a particular action one that a
“reasonable person” would engage in? Within the context of Kantian Meadows the
standard of a “reasonable person” will be employed in order to determine the
reasonableness of non-medical subjective choices made by those residents who have
limited autonomy. Such residents are those who lack the capacity for making medical
decisions but have the ability to make choices in other areas. For example, the reader may
recall the woman who chose not to wear her dentures. The job of the oversight committee
is to apply the “reasonable person” standard in order to determine if her choice should be
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respected over her daughters’ objections. The necessity of committee diversity becomes
clearer if we consider Kim Scheppele’s (2004) discussion of the need for a “reasonable
woman” standard in relation to the rape case Rusk v State (pp. 456-460). Scheppele
argues, successfully I believe, that gender is a relevant factor in determining whether or
not the victim consented to sexual intercourse. In this case Scheppele maintains that a
“reasonable woman’s” perception of the circumstances leads to a different decision than a
“reasonable person” standard with a male bias. In other words, the victim’s belief that her
life was in danger is a reasonable belief from the perspective of the “reasonable woman”
standard. Schepple’s point is that historically the legal standard of a “reasonable person”
has had a male bias. She argues that in the Rusk v State case the male perception of the
circumstances were not necessarily the perception of a “reasonable woman.” In other
words, Schepple is suggesting that in rape cases the court should recognize that the
criminal nature of a defendant’s conduct is sometimes dependent upon the victim’s point
of view. Scheppele’s suggestion of a “reasonable woman” standard has been applied by
the courts in sexual harassment and assault cases.
My point in referring to Schepple’s argument for a “reasonable woman” standard
is to demonstrate the need for gender diversity as well as professional and religious
diversity on the oversight committee. Admittedly, great difficulty is encountered in
attempting to utilize any standard of substitute judgment. However, if Kantian Meadows
is to keep its commitment to treat all residents as “if they were persons,” a substitute
standard must be adopted. Although the “reasonable person” standard is not infallible,
combining it with diversity in the oversight committee at least provides a legitimate
method for determining the reasonableness of subjective choices by those with
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diminished rationality. In addition, if the oversight committee is to be effective, the scope
of proxy consent must be restricted to its original intent.
Proxy Consent
In Chapter One I addressed the abuse of proxy consent that frequently occurs in
the nursing home setting. That is, adult children who obtain proxy consent for their
parents often use it to become dictators interfering and making decisions for every aspect
of their parent’s life. The original intent of medical proxy consent was for the person with
proxy consent to stand in the place of someone who lacked the cognitive capacity to
make their own medical decisions. At Kantian Meadows, we will honor that original
intent and go one step further. The oversight committee at Kantian Meadows will also
review proxy consent decisions in relation to medical decisions to ensure that those
decisions are in the “best interest” of the resident. This characteristic of Kantian
Meadows distinguishes it from other American nursing homes because in most cases the
decision of the person with proxy consent is accepted without question. Again I would
like to remind the reader that the function of the oversight committee is not paternalistic
in nature, but rather its goal in this case is to treat non-rational human beings as “if they
were persons.” Therefore, an oversight of decisions made by the person with proxy
consent is necessary in order to prevent the resident form being treated as a “mere
means.” The discussion of the justification for restricting proxy consent having been
completed, I will turn my discussion to the function of the pharmacists on the oversight
committee.
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Pharmaceutical Justification
Many drugs used in the treatment of long term care residents may be used either
to diminish or promote autonomy. For example, drugs like Haldol may be used to treat
mental disorders but it can also cause confusion and hallucinations. Drugs like ativan,
depending on the prescribed dosage, may have a mild tranquilizing affect or be used as a
chemical restraint. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to avert obstacles to
autonomy, it will be the responsibility of the pharmacists to review the prescribed
medications of all residents to ensure drugs are not being prescribed in order to
chemically restrain residents.
In addition, the oversight pharmacists will be responsible to review resident
prescriptions to guarantee that there is not the possibility of confusion induced by drug
interaction. I have attempted to demonstrate why the particular configuration and
qualifications of the oversight committee have been chosen, I will now turn the
discussion to the issue of treating a resident as a “mere means.”
Avoiding Treating a Resident as a “Mere Means”
As has been previously argued treating a person as a “mere means” results from
deception, manipulation or coercion. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that these
practices do not occur at Kantian Meadows. I contend that Kantian Meadows has gone
along way in ending family manipulation and coercion by restricting the use of proxy
consent. Kantian Meadows will also need a policy to address verbal and financial abuse
of residents by family members. This policy must clearly state what counts as abuse and
reporting requirements. In addition to addressing the issue of family treating residents as
“mere means,” Kantian Meadows must examine its own policies and practices.
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I believe that a lot of nursing home practices that result in treating a person as a
“mere means” are the result of inadequate staffing. In other words, understaffing creates
an environment in which residents are viewed as tasks to be completed in a timely
manner. For example, the previously mentioned practice of waking a resident up during
the middle of the night for a shower or bath. The residents chosen for these midnight
baths are always those who either cannot speak or suffer from some form of dementia. If
we apply the categorical imperative, i.e., are we using the person as a “mere means?” I
believe the answer must be YES. That is the case because I do not believe than someone
would willingly agree to the practice without being coerced or manipulated. Therefore,
from a Kantian perspective the resident is being used as a “mere means.” In light of this
consideration, Kantian Meadows’ staffing levels will be determined based on the acuity
level of the residents rather than on state and federal minimum requirements. The
difference is that under state guidelines a resident is entitled to so many hours of care per
day. In Pennsylvania, for example, it is 2.3 hours of care per day. This level of staffing is
determined in the following manner. The number of residents housed in a particular
nursing home is divided by the number of staff in a twenty-four hour period. The
resulting number must meet or exceed the state requirement. In practice this does at times
equate to the following scenario. On a unit with 60 residents it is possible that 2 nursing
assistants, one medication nurse, and one treatment nurse are left to provide all required
care including feeding residents who are unable to feed themselves. Therefore, the dining
room often resembles an assembly line in which one aide simultaneously feeds three or
four residents. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to the categorical imperative,
our level of staffing will necessarily exceed state and federal staffing requirements.
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Kant also prohibits lying. Alzheimer residents present a significant challenge to
this aspect of the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I have personally
agonized over this particular issue for some time. When I was a certified nursing assistant
working on the Alzheimer’s unit, I was instructed to orient the residents to reality. In
other words, if a resident asks you, “Is the bus coming?” we were to answer truthfully. I
often thought to myself that this was a ridiculous practice. The residents had their own
reality and nothing I said could alter that fact. However, as I approach the issue from the
perspective of this project, I believe that the answer is quite clear. In the case of
Alzheimer residents, if we are to treat them “as if they were persons,” we must answer
them in a truthful manner. Admittedly, some residents will become upset at the truth.
However, to avoid the truth in order to prevent them from becoming upset is to adopt a
paternalistic position which is clearly a violation of the duties imposed upon us by the
end formulation of the categorical imperative. Therefore, at Kantian Meadows our policy
is to be truthful with all our residents.
Restraints both physical and chemical create another area in which the potential
for treating residents as “mere means” exists. In order to avoid this problem, the oversight
committee must be diligent in ensuring that no form of restraint is employed for the
benefit or convenience of the staff. For example, it is not permissible to restrain a resident
because they are annoying the staff. In recent years the use of restraints has been severely
restricted due to the numerous deaths that have resulted from the use of physical
restraints. At Kantian Meadows the use of any form of restraint will be extremely rare
and only approved after a complete investigation by the oversight committee. The above
examples illustrate only a few examples of possible treatment of residents as “mere
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means.” These examples are not in anyway intended to be exhaustive in terms of policies
or practices that could result in the treatment of a resident as a “mere means.” The last
issue I wish to discuss is Kantian Meadows commitment to avert whenever possible
obstacles to the possibility of autonomy.
Obstacles to the Possibility of Autonomous Action
In Chapter Three we discussed, the lack of subsistence, security, and privacy as
potential obstacles to the possibility of autonomous action. Within the context of the
nursing home malnutrition can be equated with the lack of subsistence. “This is no way to
live. I wish I were dead and buried” (Burger, Kayser-Jones, & Bell, 2000). This is a
quote from a 76 year old man who died weighing 69 pounds in contrast to his ideal
weight of 150 ponds. A study of malnutrition and dehydration undertaken by Burger,
Kayser-Jones, and Bell in 2000 found the following:
Studies using a variety of measurements and performed over the last
five to 10 years on different nursing home subgroups have shown that
from 35 percent to 85 percent of U.S. nursing home residents are
malnourished. Thirty to 50 percent are substandard in body weight (vii).
In their conclusions they listed the following as contributing factors:
Structural factors within the nursing home setting that
contribute to malnutrition and dehydration include lack of
individualized care, inadequate staffing, high nurse aide turnover,
and lack of professional supervision of aides (viii).
Again the issue of inadequate staffing plays a significant role not only in creating
an environment with the potential for treating a resident as a “mere means,” but also one
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in which the obstacle of a lack of subsistence is present. In light of Kantian Meadows
commitment to the end formulation of the categorical imperative and the empirical
evidence that inadequate staffing is contrary to the duties imposed by the categorical
imperative, Kantian Meadows, as previously stated, will adopt an alternative staffing
policy.
In addition to the obstacles created by the lack of subsistence, the threat of
physical abuse also creates an obstacle to the possibility of autonomous action. Most of
the threats of physical abuse come from nursing home staff. In an attempt to avert that
possibility, Kantian Meadows will adopt a strict hiring policy. All potential employees
will under go a criminal background check similar to the background check implemented
by the public school systems. In other words, the background check will include federal
as well as state criminal background checks. There will also be a ZERO tolerance policy
in place and any suspected abuse will result in immediate suspension until an
investigation can be completed. Further, all suspected abuse will be handed over to the
local police for investigation.
Finally, Kantian Meadows will address the need for individual privacy as a means
of personhood enhancement. While HIPPA provides legal protection for privacy in
regard to medical information, Kantian Meadows will provide privacy in other areas
where possible for all its residents. For example, the practice of drawing curtains and
knocking on doors before entering will be rigorously enforced.
Conclusion
The goal of this project has been to identify the need for nursing home reform in
terms of the treatment of nursing home residents. In furtherance of that goal I have
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argued for the following thesis: Nursing homes are unethical in the strong philosophical
sense of the term because they erode autonomy, personhood, and human dignity and the
end formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative can provide a theoretical
framework for creating a just nursing home. To develop that thesis I have argued for six
distinct but inter-related propositions.
To recapitulate: In Chapter One I developed Propositions One and Two. That is, I
argued that the structure and characteristics of American nursing homes create the
potential for the objectification of nursing home residents. I defined objectification in
relation to Nussbaum’s seven criteria: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness,
fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. Next, based on an
interdisciplinary literature review I argued that objectification is a moral evil.
In Chapter Two I developed Proposition Three. Based on a critical examination of
the care perspective as a possible theoretical framework for a just nursing home, I found
the care perspective lacking in its ability to protect personhood and dignity. That
conclusion was based on three characteristics of the care perspective. First, it fosters
paternalism. Second, it erroneously assumes that face-to-face relationships result in a
caring relationship. Lastly, its abandonment of the language of rights undermines human
dignity. Finally, I argued that the “end formulation” of the categorical imperative can
provide such a theoretical framework for the creation of a just nursing home.
In Chapter Three, I developed Propositions Four and Five. That is, I argued based
on an analogy with our indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals, that we have an
indirect duty to treat non-rational human beings as if “they were persons.” I then
unpacked the “end formulation “of the categorical imperative to examine the duties it
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imposes on us. I argued that not only do we have a duty not to treat persons as “mere
means” but that we also have a duty to avert obstacles to the possibility of autonomous
action. Therefore, a just nursing home has similar duties to its residents.
Finally, in Chapter Four I developed Proposition Six and created, in theory,
Kantian Meadows; a nursing home dedicated to the ethical treatment of the elderly and
grounded in the categorical imperative. One purpose of creating Kantian Meadows was
an attempt to illustrate how a nursing committed to the ethical treatment of all its
residents and grounded in the categorical imperative might be organized. Another
purpose was to demonstrate the practical application of the categorical imperative in
terms of what policies and procedures it might endorse and what policies and procedures
it would necessarily reject. The policies and procedures I argued for were derived from
the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative.
I do not any claim that these suggestions are not without difficulty or that they are an
exhaustive list of potential reforms. However, I do claim that a commitment to justice
requires that we undertake such a reform. A reform which I will argue that must begin
with a reassessment of our staffing requirement and a commitment to the ethical
treatment of all nursing home residents. I believe that the fictional Kantian Meadows can
provide a starting point for that reform. However, unfortunately it has been my
experience that American nursing homes more closely resemble a General Motors
assembly line than Kantian Meadows. From my perspective, this is problematic because
human beings are not objects and therefore should never be treated as if they were
objects.
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